most of the extreme individualists of the eighteenth century were materialists. But space does not permit any criticism of Professor Fite's implied metaphysics. A mechanical view of the social life, however, by no means follows from the rejection of his individualistic premises, as he implies.

The book is profoundly symptomatic of our age. It expresses the strife between the ideals in our modern life better than any recent philosophical work which the writer of this review has read. Because it does so, and because it puts so strongly the case for individualism in psychology, sociology, and ethics, it certainly deserves to be read, and read carefully, by all who are interested in those disciplines.

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THE MORAL LIFE AND MORAL WORTH. By W. R. Sorley, Litt.D. Cambridge: University Press, 1911. Pp. 147.

The present little book is one of the few contributions in the sphere of moral science that have as yet been made to the admirable series of condensed accounts of special subjects which distinguished authorities are writing for the Cambridge University Press. It well maintains the reputation which that series has won of being intelligible to the cultured layman without being 'popular' in a bad sense.

For the purpose of the present work Professor Sorley treats ethics as an account of virtue. In a general treatise on ethics we might quarrel with this method for beginning with too complex matter; but for general intelligibility, and in view of the limitations of space imposed on the author, this is probably the best method.

The book begins by distinguishing the purely historical view of ethical subject-matter from its properly ethical treatment. And it suggests that the apparent divergence of ethical judgment between different nations and times is largely due to improper limitation of ethical principles to one's own tribe or family. Still this does not of course get rid of the fact that there is a real ethical difference between holding that one ought not to cheat anyone and holding that one is at liberty to cheat strangers. Professor Sorley classifies the virtues into those that are mainly concerned with the individual, those that are mainly

concerned with society, and the theological virtues. He then discusses the special virtues in turn. Under the first heading he places courage, temperance, and wisdom. Both courage and temperance become very much widened in meaning under Professor Sorley's discussion of them. Courage seems to end by including the characteristic which is desiderated when we are told 'not to be *wearied* with well-doing'; and temperance is made to include any habit of right judgment about relative values where one side must be sacrificed, as where we have to choose between working in the slums or increasing our knowledge of the philosophy of mathematics. Professor Sorley's discussion gives me the impression that he would be unduly severe on the man who chose the latter alternative! Under the subject, wisdom,—as elsewhere in the book,—there is a discussion on the connection between volition and virtue, and it seems to contain a slight confusion. Sometimes it seems to be held that virtue must be a habit of choice and sometimes that any habit that can be modified by volition may be a virtue. I do not see that the latter view can be maintained. The power of intellectual concentration is a virtue because it is voluntary, not because it can be made more or less of a habit by appropriate volition. In the main, however, wisdom seems to reduce for Professor Sorley to the habit of intellectual honesty.

Under the second sub-division, justice and benevolence are discussed. As usual, the discussion on justice,—which Professor Sorley reduces to that of right,—mainly shows the inextricable confusion of our ideas on the subject. The assertion of natural rights is shown to be the statement of the more salient features in any distribution of good that we should call just; but it is also shown that, as stated, these rights are incompatible, and justice must be found, if at all, in some compromise between them. But no suggestion is offered as to a dependable principle of compromise. A difficulty is found in distinguishing justice from benevolence, and it is suggested that for the ideal man in the ideal state they would coincide. But ought we not rather to say that if justice be right distribution of goods (whatever that may mean) to everyone, benevolence is that part of it that deals with right distribution to others?

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